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1 
INTEREST OF AMICUS CURIAE 
Barbara Creel, is a tenured Professor of Law and the Director of the 
Southwest Indian Law Clinic (“SILC”)1, at the University of New Mexico School 
of Law. Professor Creel teaches, researches, and practices federal Indian law, and 
criminal law and procedure. SILC is a nationally recognized clinical program 
dedicated to legal representation of Tribes, Tribal entities and Native American 
individuals in state, federal, and tribal courts. SILC has expertise in multi-
jurisdictional litigation, analyzing complex legal issues involving the intersection 
of federal Indian law, criminal law, constitutional law and civil/human rights.   
As an enrolled tribal member, a former assistant federal public defender, and 
former tribal criminal defender for the Confederated Tribes of the Warm Springs 
Indian Reservation, Creel has a unique and valuable perspective. She has testified 
before Congress, the Indian Law and Order Commission, and the Committee to 
review the Criminal Justice Act Program on issues of criminal jurisdiction, right to 
counsel for Native Americans, indigent defense, access to justice  and the writ of 
habeas corpus under the Indian Civil Rights Act. She has consulted or co-counseled 
1 Pursuant to Cir. Rule 29-2(a), amicus states that all parties have consented to the 
filing of this brief. Pursuant to Fed. R. App. P. 29(a)(4)(E), amicus further states 
that no counsel for a party authored this brief in whole or in part. No party, no 
counsel for a party, and no person other than Amicus, their members, and their 
counsel made a monetary contribution intended to fund preparation or submission 
of this brief.  
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on complex federal cases involving Native American defendants. Under her 
direction, SILC has successfully litigated numerous federal habeas corpus petitions 
under 25 U.S.C. Section 1303, and has a unique understanding of the individual 
rights of defendants vis- a-vis their tribe, as well as a special expertise in Indian 
law, sovereignty, and civil rights. No other Native American rights organization is 
focused on criminal defense and Indian law.   
SILC has an interest in the issue presented by Defendant-Appellant Johnny 
Smith. Specifically, the Court’s determination of whether the Assimilative Crimes 
Act, 18 U.S.C. Section 13 (“ACA”), and the Indian Country Crimes Act, 18 U.S.C. 
Section 1152 (“ICCA”), can be used to apply state laws to Indian defendants 
committing victimless or non-major crimes affects the work of clinical law students 
and other organizations protecting Indian defendants’ rights. SILC is concerned 
with the right to equal protection and right to due process of persons accused of 
crime and the right to self-government of tribal nations in the United States.  
While Congress  established the ACA as a “gap-filler,” Congress has never 
explicitly  authorized the application of the ACA to expand criminal jurisdiction to 
apply state law to prosecute  Indians who have committed victimless or non-major 
crimes. The federal courts have not properly reviewed the ACA and the racial 
application of the ACA to Indians under the ICCA. This under-analysis or failure 
to comprehend the complexity of race-based application of the laws has led to a 
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haphazard and incorrect application of the ACA in Indian Country. SILC has an 
interest in ensuring equal protection of Indian defendants’ rights and that tribal 
sovereign authority to self-govern remains protected from state or federal intrusion.  
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT 
Prior cases, have assumed, without analysis that the ACA applies to Indian 
Country. This review of the ACA failed to consider and incorporate clearly 
established Indian law principles and foundational tenets of criminal law in the 
analysis of its applicability to Indians and Indian Country. Most importantly, the 
precedent and the Court below failed to understand the racial component involved 
in the analysis. These failures to understand the principles of Indian law and 
criminal law, have rendered haphazard and incoherent decisions.  
Amici seek to bring clarity to the complex jurisdictional interplay and 
provide a practical framework for the proper analysis in applying the ACA and 
determining whether jurisdiction exists for purposes of prosecuting conduct 
occurring in Indian Country. Williams v. United States, 327 U.S. 711 (1946) 
involved a  non-Indian defendant’s rape of an Indian victim -- and thus, the Court 
did not reach the application of the ACA to Indian defendants under the ICCA. 
There can be no such application consistent with clearly establish principles of 
federal Indian law and jurisdiction. 
ARGUMENT 
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I. The ACA has been Under-Analyzed, and Consequently, Misapplied, in 
This Context (Where Major Crimes Act does not Apply). 
Williams v. United States, 327 U.S. 711 (1946) is often cited for the 
proposition that the ACA applies to Indian country. See, e.g., United States v. 
Marcyes, 557 F.2d 1361, 1365 n.1 (9th Cir. 1977); United States v. Sosseur, 181 
F.2d 873, 874 (7th Cir. 1959). Williams considered a narrow exercise of 
jurisdiction over a non-Indian’s conduct on the reservation – the precise type of 
conduct the ACA was developed to address. 327 U.S. at 714 (“While the laws and 
courts of the State of Arizona may have jurisdiction over offenses committed on 
this reservation between persons who are not Indians, the laws and courts of the 
United States, rather than those of Arizona, have jurisdiction over offenses 
committed there, as in this case, by one who is not an Indian against one who is an 
Indian.”); COHEN’S HANDBOOK OF FEDERAL INDIAN LAW (”COHEN’S”) at 734
(2005). Williams has been misapplied to extend to Indian conduct on the 
reservation, despite an absence of jurisdiction under federal law. 
In Indian Country, the federal government has jurisdiction under the Major 
Crimes Act (“MCA”), 18 U.S.C. Section 1153, over 16 enumerated crimes when 
committed by Indians against other Indians or non-Indians. In addition, the ICCA 
extends federal criminal laws that apply to areas of exclusive federal jurisdiction 
such as military bases and national parks, cybersecurity, counterfeiting money and 
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other federal laws to Indian country. But, if a crime committed in Indian country is 
not covered by the MCA, or in an express federal criminal code, a federal 
prosecutor may apply state criminal law through the ACA. See Williams, 327 at 
711 (assuming that the ACA was subsumed within the ICCA); COHEN’S at 734. 
The ICCA applies where a tribal member and a non-Indian are involved as victim 
and perpetrator, and thus the defendant may be Indian or non-Indian.  
The plain language of the ICCA has three important exceptions relevant to 
Defendant Johnny Smith’s case. First, Indian-against-Indian crimes are not 
covered. 18 U.S.C. § 1152. That includes victimless crimes. See e.g., United States 
v. Quiver, 241 U.S. 602, 605-606 (1916) (adultery not covered by the ICCA 
because it “is a voluntary act on the part of both participants, and, strictly speaking, 
not an offense against the person of either”); see also COHEN’S at 735-736 (citing 
and criticizing lower court cases that have not followed Quiver); United States v. 
Blue, 722 F.2d 383, 386 n.4 (8th Cir. 1983) (observing in dicta that “the Indian 
against Indian exception has been read very broadly to include ‘victimless’ crimes 
affecting only Indians”); Acunia v. United States, 404 F.2d 140 (9th Cir. 1968) 
(discussing crime of incest as being within exclusive tribal jurisdiction). But see
United States v. Thunder Hawk, 127 F.3d 705, 708 (8th Cir. 1997) (driving under 
influence of alcohol is victimless crime not subject to Indian-against-Indian 
exception); United States v. Marcyes, 557 F.2d 1361, 1364–65 (9th Cir. 1977) 
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(upholding fireworks possession conviction without discussion of exception); 
United States v. Sosseur, 181 F.2d 873, 876 (7th Cir. 1950) (sustaining conviction 
for operating slot machines where Indian “defendant furnished the means by which 
non-Indians were enabled and induced to violate the Wisconsin law”). In this case, 
there is no evidence that Mr. Smith’s conduct in eluding police involved a victim, 
and as a crime involving only Indians (even potentially), Mr. Smith’s conduct is 
not within the reach of the ICCA.   
Second, if an Indian has been punished for a crime under tribal law, that 
person may not be prosecuted under the ICCA for the same offense. 18 U.S.C. § 
1152. Indian Tribal courts have criminal jurisdiction over their own members and 
other Indians who are members of federally recognized tribes. See United States v. 
Lara, 541 U.S. 193 (2004). In this case, Mr. Smith, an Indian defendant, was 
punished by the law of the tribe prior to being prosecuting for the same conduct in 
federal court. Mr. Smith was subject to Warm Springs2 Tribal Code § 310.520, 
which prohibits eluding police and the Or. Rev. Stat. § 811.540(1) prohibiting the 
same conduct. The prior punishment by the law of the Tribe precluded the federal 
court’s punishment for the same conduct.  
2 See 25 U.S.C. §§ 1321-22 (excluding Warm Springs Reservation from state 
jurisdiction under Public Law 280). 
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Third, no party argues that Mr. Smith is subject to prosecution for a violation 
of state law in federal court based upon a treaty between the sovereigns. 18 U.S.C. 
§ 1152. All three exceptions apply, thereby supporting the relief sought in 
Defendant-Appellant’s Motion to Dismiss for lack of Subject Matter Jurisdiction.  
Because there is no federal law covering the conduct which Mr. Smith is accused 
and because Mr. Smith was punished by his tribe, and there is otherwise no treaty 
conferring jurisdiction over him, this case is exclusively within the tribe’s 
jurisdiction. See Ex Parte Crow Dog, 109 U.S. 556 (1883) (holding that the ICCA 
did not apply where an Indian was accused of murdering another Indian because 
the statute excludes Indians v. Indians; excludes punishment by law of land; and 
there is no treaty conferring exclusive jurisdiction). 
II. An Improper Expansion of Jurisdiction under the ACA Subjects Indian 
Defendants to Cherry-Picking by Federal Prosecutors within Three Sets 
of Criminal Codes. 
A. Singling out Indians is An Equal Protection Issue.  
Tribal courts have the power to bring such prosecutions independently of the 
federal government. Thus, a defendant may face prosecution from the tribal court 
and then face prosecution from a federal court for the same offense. Because Indian 
tribes are separate sovereigns with inherent powers predating the existence of the 
United States, the Supreme Court held in United States v. Wheeler that dual 
prosecutions for the same offense under these circumstances do not violate the 
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double jeopardy clause of the Fifth Amendment of the United States Constitution. 
435 U.S. 313, 322–30 (1978) (federal prosecution following acquittal in tribal court 
does not normally raise double jeopardy concerns). Uniquely, Indian defendants 
are subject to three sets of laws - state, federal, and tribal - resulting in what would 
otherwise be inherently unfair and would implicate double jeopardy protections for 
a non-Indian. This allows federal prosecutors to pick and choose to prosecute for 
harsher penalties or under easier burdens of proof as though playing with a 
person’s freedom is nothing more than a strategic game.  
The inherent unfairness of subjecting Indians to criminal punishment, 
depriving them of their liberties, deprives Indians of equal protection of laws. 
Although raised before the United State Supreme Court unsuccessfully in United 
States v. Antelope, the Court did not foreclose the existence of equal protection 
issues in other contexts. 430 U.S. 641 (1977) (denying equal protection challenge 
because Indian status is a political classification not a racial one). The Court left 
open the question of whether federal prosecution of a non-enrolled Indian living on 
the reservation and maintaining tribal relations violates equal protection, and 
reserved judgment on whether subjecting Indians and non-Indians tried in federal 
court for the same offense to different penalties is a violation.3 Id. at 649, n.11.   
3 Given the disproportionate number of Indians prosecuted in federal court for 
actions that would normally be prosecuted in state court, concern has arisen about 
  Case: 17-30248, 03/20/2018, ID: 10806481, DktEntry: 9, Page 15 of 25
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In fact, the Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals has held that disparities in 
punishment and burden of proof solely on the basis of Indian race violated an 
Indian’s right to equal protection of laws. United States v. Cleveland, 503 F.2d 
1067 (9th Cir. 1974) (holding that substantial disparities in potential punishment 
and burden of proof between Indian and non-Indian defendants charged with 
committing an identical offense solely on the basis of race was a violation of equal 
protection). See also Williams v. Babbitt, 115 F.3d 657, 661-666 (9th Cir. 1997) 
(applying the ICC and holding that BIA policy prohibiting non-Indians from 
engaging in reindeer herding was “not unreasonable” but declining to defer to the 
agency interpretation due to potential Equal Protection concerns).  But see United 
States v. Wanoskia, 800 F.2d 235, 239 (10th Cir. 1986) (rejecting equal protection 
challenge where an Indian defendant was sentenced to sixty years for second 
degree murder of an Indian whereas a similar crime between non-Indians would 
receive a maximum nine-year sentence in state court; reasoning that a non-Indian 
would be subject to the same federal penalties under the ICCA as the Indian 
defendant under the MCA). A consideration of the Indian Canons of Construction 
and the rule of lenity can help mitigate this disparate impact.  
the disproportionate impact of the sentencing guidelines on Indians. See Jon M. 
Sands, Departure Reform and Indian Crimes: Reading the Commission’s Staff 
Paper with “Reservations,” 9 Fed. Sent. Rep. 144 (1996); U. S. Sentencing 
Comm’n, Report of the Native American Advisory Group 21–25 (Nov. 4, 2003). 
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B. Indian Canons of Construction Dictate Liberal Construction in 
Favor of Tribal Sovereignty.  
The Supreme Court of the United States has established that “the standard 
principles of statutory interpretation do not have their usual force in cases 
involving Indian law.” Montana v. Blackfeet Tribe, 471 U.S. 759, 766 (1985).  The 
Indian Canons of Construction (ICC) were created to guide statutory interpretations 
involving Indian law. The ICC will normally displace other competing canons of 
construction. See EEOC v. Karuk Tribe House Auth., 260 F.3d 1071 (9th Cir. 2001) 
(normal rules of statutory construction dictating that tribe was employer under Age 
Discrimination in Employment Act do not apply in Indian law cases).  
The ICC require that statutes be liberally construed in favor of tribes. See, 
e.g., Ramah Navajo School Board v. Bur. of Revenue, 458 U.S. 832, 846 (1982) 
(“We have consistently admonished that federal statutes and regulations relating to 
tribes and tribal activities must be construed generously in order to comport with 
… traditional notions of [Indian] sovereignty and with the federal policy of 
encouraging tribal independence); Bryan v. Itasca County, 426 U.S. 373, 392 
(1976) (“[W]e must be guided by that ‘eminently sound and vital canon’ … that 
‘statutes passed for the benefit of dependent Indian tribes are to be liberally 
construed, doubtful expressions being resolved in favor of the Indians.’ ”). All 
ambiguities be resolved in the Indian tribes’ favor. See, e.g., County of Yakima v. 
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Confederated Tribes & Bands of the Yakima Indian Nation, 502 U.S. 251, 269 
(1992) (“When we are faced with these two possible constructions [of a statute], 
our choice between them must be dictated by a principle deeply rooted in this 
Court’s Indian jurisprudence: ‘Statutes are to be construed liberally in favor of the 
Indians, with ambiguous provisions interpreted to their benefit.’ ”). See also Gila 
River Indian Cmty. v. United States, 729 F.3d 1139, 1148 (9th Cir. 2013).   
In addition, statutes must be interpreted for the preservation of tribal 
sovereignty and property rights unless Congress’s intent is clear and unambiguous 
to the contrary. See, e.g., Michigan v. Bay Mills Indian Cmty., 134 S. Ct. 2024, 
2031 (2014) (“[A] congressional decision [to abrogate tribal immunity] must be 
clear. … That rule of construction reflects an enduring principle of Indian law: 
Although Congress has plenary authority over tribes, courts will not lightly assume 
that Congress in fact intends to undermine Indian self-government.”); Rincon Band 
of Luiseno Indians v. Schwarzenegger, 602 F.3d 1019 (9th Cir. 2010). See also
United States v. Dion, 476 U.S. 734, 739-40 (1986); Santa Clara Pueblo v. 
Martinez, 436 U.S. 49, 59–60 (1978); Fisher v. Dist. Ct., 424 U.S. 382, 387–388 
(1976). A proper analysis under the Indian Canons of Construction requires this 
court vacate the Order of Dismissal entered by the trial court.  
C. In the Criminal Law Context, the Rule of Lenity Requires any 
Ambiguity to be Resolved in Favor of the Accused.   
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Indians are United States citizens4 entitled to constitutional protections. 
Indians charged with crimes in federal or state courts have all the rights afforded 
other criminal defendants. To the extent the plain language of a criminal statute 
like Section 1152 is ambiguous, the rule of lenity provides that doubts must be 
resolved in favor of the defendant. United States v. Bass, 404 U.S. 336, 348 (1971); 
see also United States v. Wiltberger, 18 U.S. (1 Wheat) 76, 95 (1820) (Marshall, 
C.J.) (“The rule that penal laws are to be construed strictly, is perhaps not much 
less old than construction itself.”). “This venerable rule not only vindicates the 
fundamental principle that no citizen should be … subjected to punishment that is 
not clearly prescribed. It also places the weight of inertia upon the party that can 
best induce Congress to speak more clearly and keeps courts from making criminal 
law in Congress’s stead.” United States v. Santos, 128 S. Ct. 2020, 2025 (2008) 
(plurality opinion) (Scalia, J.). 
The rule of lenity serves at least three purposes. First, it ensures fair notice. 
“[I]t is reasonable that a fair warning should be given to the world in language that 
the common world will understand, of what the law intends to do if a certain line is 
passed.” McBoyle v. United States, 283 U.S. 25, 27 (1931). Second, it preserves the 
separation of powers. Chief Justice Marshall observed: “the power of punishment 
is vested in the legislative, not in the judicial department. It is the legislature, not 
4 Indian Citizenship Act of 1924, June 2, 1924, 8 U.S.C. §1401 (b), 43 Stat. 253.  
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the court, which is to define a crime, and ordain its punishment.”  Wiltberger, 18 
U.S. at 95. “This policy embodies the instinctive dictates against men languishing 
in prison unless the lawmaker has clearly said they should.” Id. Lenity prevents the 
imposition of punishment that Congress has not clearly authorized, because 
Congress is the only branch of government with the authority to establish criminal 
penalties. See United States v. Evans, 333 U.S. 483, 486 (1948). Third, it 
“minimize[s] the risk of selective or arbitrary enforcement” of criminal statutes by 
requiring the resolution of ambiguity in the same direction. United States v. 
Kozminski, 487 U.S. 931, 952 (1988); see also Bryan v. United States, 524 U.S. 
184, 205 (1998) (Scalia, dissenting) (rule of lenity “foster[s] uniformity in the 
interpretation of criminal statutes”). All three of these purposes apply here where 
the individual Indian defendant faces federal prosecution for a state crime, where 
there is not clear jurisdiction, and is exposed to harsher sentencing in federal court. 
See Barbara L. Creel, The Right to Counsel of Indians Accused of Crime: A Tribal 
and Congressional Imperative, Michigan J. Race & L. Vol. 18, pg. 351.  The more 
respectful view of tribal self-determination requires recognition  of the tribal court 
conviction to supersede the federal law. See, e.g., Santa Ana, 663 F.Supp. at 1309 
(focusing its analysis upon the “preemptive application of the federal statutory rape 
law and concluded that the more lenient federal law superseded the state law.”). 
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III. A Practical Summary of Criminal Jurisdiction in Indian Country.5
The ICCA explicitly states that offenses involving an Indian against another 
Indian or their property, is not within the jurisdiction of the federal government, 
rather it remains with the tribe. While the statute explicitly applies to crimes that 
have identifiable victims, it remains silent on crimes that are inherently victimless.  
Interpreting this silence liberally in favor of the tribes requires that inherently 
victimless crimes be left to tribal governments to enforce. 
IV.    Applying the Formula in this Context, Under Indian Law Principles, the 
ACA has no Application in This Case or Similar Context. 
Johnny Smith, an Indian defendant, cannot be subject to federal prosecution 
through the ACA for a victimless crime which occurred within Indian country. The 
5 Source: Indian Law and Order Comm’n, A Roadmap for Making Native America 
Safer: Report to the President and Congress of the United States (Nov. 2013) 
(Figure 1-1), available at https://www.aisc.ucla.edu/iloc/report/. 
  Case: 17-30248, 03/20/2018, ID: 10806481, DktEntry: 9, Page 21 of 25
15 
ACA does not expressly state a Congressional intent to abrogate the tribes 
sovereign power to enforce the laws within an Indian reservation. The ICC require 
congressional silence to be interpreted in favor of tribal sovereignty and 
jurisdiction. Therefore, the ACA alone cannot create federal jurisdiction over the 
criminal conduct of Johnny Smith.   
For the ACA to have any applicability in Indian country, jurisdiction must 
come from either the ICCA or the MCA. As this is not a major crime as defined in 
the MCA it can only come from the ICCA. However, the ICCA has left any crime 
that either involves only Indians or was already prosecuted by the tribe to the 
jurisdiction of the tribe. Johnny Smith committed a victimless crime and was 
tribally prosecuted for his crime, both of which preclude federal prosecution under 
the ICCA. As there is no federal jurisdiction under the ICCA for Johnny Smith’s 
conduct, the ACA also does not apply. In addition, Johnny Smith is entitled to 
Equal Protection of laws. Instead, he is subject to cherry-picking by federal 
prosecutors among three sets of laws and potentially harsher punishments for the 
same conduct. A proper application of the ACA, liberally construed in favor of 
Indians and with an eye toward lenity, avoids this harsh and unfair result.  
CONCLUSION 
Amicus Curiae Southwest Indian Law Clinic respectfully requests that this 
Court reverse the district court’s Order of Denial of Motion to Dismiss. 
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